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MODERNIZACIÓN RESILIENTE: LA CRUZ ROJA EN MARRUECOS DE HASSAN I A LA REPÚBLICA DEL RIF 
(1886-1926)
RESUMEN: Hacia finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX, los proyectos de modernización de Marruecos incluyeron planes de adhe-
sión a la Convención de Ginebra y de creación de una sociedad local de la Cruz/Media Luna Roja. Estos planes surgieron de la conver-
gencia entre las reformas administrativas/militares marroquíes y las intervenciones “regeneracionistas” españolas. Transcurrieron en 
paralelo con los desarrollos en países islámicos líderes como Egipto, Persia y el Imperio Otomano, aunque habrían de esperar para 
hacerse realidad hasta la independencia del país de la dominación franco-española en 1956. Más allá de la falta de resultados con-
cretos, estas tempranas iniciativas servirían como marco legal a la “soberanía humanitaria” de Marruecos, tácitamente confirmada 
mediante las cláusulas del Acta de Algeciras de 1906. Durante las siguientes dos décadas, la resiliencia de esta soberanía se haría 
patente en la competición entre la Cruz Roja Española y la Francesa por la “hegemonía humanitaria” en Marruecos, así como en las 
repetidas y casi exitosas demandas para el establecimiento de una Cruz/Media Luna Roja rifeña, que hizo al Comité Internacional de 
la Cruz Roja el líder insurgente Abdelkrim durante la Guerra del Rif.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Marruecos; siglos XIX-XX; Cruz Roja; agencia local; imperialismo franco-español.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 19th century, Islamic countries such as 
the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Persia launched pro-
grams of reform aimed at modernising the structures 
of their armies, State bureaucracies and economies in 
an effort to deal with the growing challenges posed 
by European hegemony in the world (Al-Sayyid, 1984; 
Moreau, 2007; Moreau 2009). Traditionally, these 
programmes have been analysed in terms of export, 
transfer or diffusion of ideas and institutions from 
Western/European centres to Islamic peripheries 
by imperialist enforcement. However, they might be 
better described and understood as part of a global 
process of modernisation which involved the simulta-
neous and connected emergence of modern societies 
in various parts of the world with specific paths and 
outcomes in each particular locality. The modernisa-
tion of science, technology and medicine (STM) in 
Islamic countries, a very relevant component of the 
aforementioned reform plans (Longuenesse, 1995; 
Anastassiadou-Dumont, 2003; Crozet, 2008; Moulin, 
Ulman, 2010), could be similarly conceived. Modern 
STM would have originated and developed not only in 
Europe or the West but in various locations through-
out the world as a result of “reciprocal, although 
asymmetric processes of circulation” of ideas, prac-
tices and objects (Raj, 2010, p. 8, 13). Accordingly, it 
should be viewed as “an integral part in the history 
of medicine beyond the West” (Ebrahimnejad, 2005, 
p. 3). This would mean abandoning the conceptuali-
sation of STM in terms of self-contained “systems”, 
such as “Islamic science” or “Western science” and 
acknowledging the continuities existing between tra-
dition and novelty, the old and the new. The history of 
modern STM in non-Western countries would then be 
regarded as “an internal and built-in process” in which 
local agency played a more or less relevant role (Ebra-
himnejad, 2005, p. 8).
The development of secular humanitarianism may 
be taken as an example of social and medical mod-
ernisation. Among the various relief organisations 
founded in Islamic countries in the past two centuries, 
the Red Cross has figured prominently. Although no 
Islamic country took part in the international meet-
ing of August 1864 in which the First Geneva Conven-
tion was agreed, the Ottoman Empire joined hardly 
a year after its signature and Qajar Persia followed 
suit in 1874 (Hüsnü, 2004, p. 22). The self-styled Ot-
toman Red Crescent (ORC) society (Osmanli Hilal-i 
Ahmer Cemiyeti) was founded as early as July 1868, 
even though its actual existence and activities began 
only eight years later in the course of the Russo-Ot-
toman War of 1877-78, and would be subsequently 
interrupted until the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 
and finally until 1911, on the eve of the First Balkan 
War that definitely consolidated its permanent status 
(Hüsnü, 2004, pp. 22-28). The pioneering role of the 
ORC, which comprised the use of the term “crescent” 
and the official recognition of a moon-shaped logo, 
paved the way for other societies in the Islamic world. 
The Egyptian Red Crescent (ERC) and the Indian Red 
Crescent came into being in 19111 (Tanvir, 2009, 
p. 394), the Azerbaijan society in 1920 and again in 
19222 and the Afghan Red Crescent in 1934. In Persia, 
the denomination and emblem of the Red Lion and 
Sun Society created in 1922 suited its own local tradi-
tions (Kashani-Sabet, 2011, p. 105).
This paper sets out to give an account of the origins 
of the Red Cross in Morocco. A Moroccan-centered 
perspective is attempted in order to explore the es-
sential connection of humanitarian plans with local 
processes of State reform and modernisation. Thus, 
we must begin by acknowledging that those early 
projects failed. Unlike other Islamic countries, the 
adherence of Morocco to the Geneva Convention did 
not occur until its independence in July 1956. The 
Moroccan Red Crescent society began its existence 
only a year later and was recognised by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 19583. 
One of the main reasons for such a delay was the in-
ability of Morocco to maintain its independence and 
sovereignty. The country was subject to a complex 
partition by European powers from 1906 onwards, 
which materialised in a French Protectorate, a Span-
ish Protectorate (itself divided into a Northern and a 
Southern area) and the so-called International Zone 
of Tangier. However, we should refrain from mak-
ing too sharp a historiographical divide around that 
event. The very complexity of partition was actually a 
sign of the weak but nonetheless resilient4  agency of 
Morocco due to the previous existence of a State ap-
paratus with significant administrative and military 
development, as well as international recognition. 
The Algeciras Conference of 1906 and the Protector-
ate Treaties of 1912 could not completely do away 
with the Moroccan State as they intended. Similarly, 
early local attempts at joining the Red Cross move-
ment, modest and unsuccessful as they were, would 
have a lasting influence on the later deployment of 
the French and Spanish Red Cross and would serve 
as basis for local projects to create a Red Cross/Cres-
cent during the so-called Rif5 War.
REFORM, REGENERATION AND THE RED CROSS IN 
INDEPENDENT MOROCCO, 1886-1906
As far as we know, no Sultan of Morocco asked the 
ICRC for recognition of a Moroccan Red Cross/Crescent 
society during the 19th century. However, other initia-
tives in relation to the Red Cross were launched during 
the reigns of Hassan I (1873-94) and Abdelaziz (1894-
1908). Such initiatives emerged from the convergence 
of a double impulse. On the one hand, the local pro-
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gramme of reforms which continued the modernisation 
drive started by Abderrahmane ibn Hicham (1822-59) 
and Mohammed IV (1859-73) in parallel to and inspired 
by earlier examples in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt 
(Miège, 1961; Pennell, 2000; Martínez Antonio, 2011). 
Reforms focused on the army and State bureaucracy, as 
well as on diplomacy and the opening of the Moroccan 
economy to the world market. In the case of the army, 
European officers were hired and so-called “military 
missions” were permitted residence in order to train lo-
cal units (Rollman, 1983; Simou, 1995). Weapons and 
equipment were purchased abroad and student mis-
sions were also sent to various European destinations. 
In the technical branches of the army (medicine, engi-
neering, artillery), student missions were combined with 
the creation of local institutions. Military engineers were 
trained from 1891 in the rifle and ammunition factory 
of Fez directed by the Italian Artillery Colonel Gregorio 
Bregoli (Tamburini, 2002; Tamburini, 2011). In Tangier, 
military physicians had been trained since 1886 in the 
School of Medicine founded by the Spanish army medi-
cal officer Felipe Óvilo (Martínez Antonio, 2009; Martín-
ez Antonio, 2012).
Spain provided the second component for Moroc-
co’s early Red Cross initiatives through its plans for 
intervention in the country during the first decades of 
the Restoration period started in 1875. In my opinion, 
Spanish “Africanist” circles based in Madrid institu-
tions such as the Sociedad Geográfica, the Sociedad 
Española de Africanistas y Colonistas and the Ateneo 
promoted a programme for “regenerating” Morocco 
similar to the one conceived for Spain itself (Martínez 
Antonio, González, 2011). Such a programme was 
also pursued from Barcelona by the Compañía Trans-
atlántica of the Marquis of Comillas and the Sociedad 
de Geografía Comercial, as well as by other institu-
tions in the main Spanish cities. The model of “re-
generation” was different from that of the “civilising 
mission” being adopted by Great Britain and France 
in this period as the ideology of colonial expansion. It 
was different because Spain was less capable of sin-
gle-handed coercion in Morocco than the major Eu-
ropean powers and because Morocco was a more de-
veloped society than others in Asia and Africa which 
had already been or were in the process of being colo-
nised. Regenerationist strategists longed for exclusive 
Spanish control of Morocco with a view to creating 
a so-called “African Spain” (Martínez-Antonio, 2013). 
However, such control involved, on the one hand, 
accepting an active participation of Moroccan elites 
that Spain would undertake to train (government of-
ficials, army officers, physicians, engineers). On the 
other hand, Spain did not intend to dismantle the old 
State apparatus but to sustain ongoing modernising 
reforms by improving tax collection, strengthening 
the army, launching public works programmes, devel-
oping education and public health, etc. The benefits 
would reach some sectors of Moroccan society, and 
not merely suit Spanish interests.
The convergence of Moroccan reform and Spanish 
regeneration in the field of secular humanitarianism 
resulted in the creation of the Tangier Lifeboat Board 
(Junta de Salvamento de Náufragos) in December 
18866. Dr. Óvilo, a well-known agent of Spanish Af-
ricanist circles in Morocco, and Rodolfo Vidal Batlló, 
representative of the Compañía Transatlántica in Tan-
gier managed to achieve the Sultan’s approval by way 
of his newly appointed delegate (naib) in the city Sidi 
Mohammed Torres7. In a way, Óvilo and Vidal were 
transplanting into Morocco a branch of the Spanish 
Lifeboat Society (Sociedad Española de Salvamento 
de Náufragos) founded in 1880 by the hydrographer 
Martín Ferreiro Peralta following European precedents 
such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (1854) in 
Great Britain and the Société Centrale de Sauvetage de 
Naufragés (1865) in France (García, 1965). The Socie-
dad consisted of a central commission in Madrid which 
coordinated a network of local Juntas established in the 
main ports of Spain and was declared “a charity of pub-
lic utility” by the Spanish government in January 1887 
(Quero, 2002). However, the Tangier Lifeboat Board 
was also part of the Moroccan administration because 
its activities were dependent upon the executive de-
cisions of Moroccan authorities and its non-technical 
staff included Moroccan representatives. In that sense, 
it was similar to other mixed Moroccan-Spanish institu-
tions promoted by Óvilo in Tangier such as the School 
of Medicine and the Chamber of Commerce.
Picture 1. Portrait of Felipe Óvilo in Marrakech, by Enri-
que Simonet (1894). Source: Courtesy of Milagro Óvilo.
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It was a common trend throughout Europe for 
the charitable nature of shipwreck rescue to gradu-
ally intertwine its institutions with those of the Red 
Cross, especially when the Hague Peace Conference 
of 1899 “finally extended to war at sea the principles 
of the 1864 Geneva Convention” (Hutchinson, 1996, 
p. 195). Thus, the creation of the Lifeboat Board 
could have had some positive feedback on the crea-
tion of a Moroccan Red Cross. Attempts – stemming 
also from the convergence of reform-regeneration 
– were actually made for the country to sign up to 
the Geneva Convention. Although they failed, they 
would anyhow have a significant impact in the fu-
ture. Their origin might be traced back to the harsh 
armed clashes between the Sultan’s regular army 
and Andjera tribesmen that occurred in the vicin-
ity of Tangier in the summer and autumn of 1892. 
Óvilo, with the help of his colleagues Severo Ce-
narro and Sotero García de Mayoral and of his Mo-
roccan disciples trained at the School of Medicine, 
provided medical assistance to the Sultan’s army on 
the field while also performing surgical operations 
in the dispensary attached to the above mentioned 
School. The Spanish and Tangier press portrayed 
their intervention as a “humanitarian task” in which 
they had been “very well received”8. Óvilo was offi-
cially congratulated by the Sultan and praised by the 
“commanders of the military units that took part in 
the combat and collectively by the kaids of the me-
hallas due to his scientific, professional and humane 
conduct” (Laredo, 1994, p. 170).
In the following years, internal strife grew harsher 
in Morocco. A raid punished Guelaya tribes which 
had attacked Spanish troops in the vicinity of Me-
lilla in December 1893; the uprising of the Reham-
na tribe in the vicinity of Marrakech in 1896 was 
bloodily suppressed; a mehalla sent by the Sultan 
castigated Riffian tribes for their piratical activities 
in 1898 (Pennell, 2000, pp. 113-114). In this con-
text, Dr. Óvilo must have seriously thought of per-
suading the Moroccan authorities to create a Red 
Cross/Crescent society. His plans would be, howev-
er, disrupted by the onset of the last war for Cuban 
independence. Óvilo was unwillingly transferred to 
Havana in December 1896 and though he was sent 
back to Spain just six months later due to yellow 
fever, he decided to leave the army and never re-
sumed his post in Morocco. Despite all, in May 1897 
the Central Committee of the Spanish Red Cross 
(SRC) in Madrid addressed the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to inquire of the new Sultan Abdelaziz the 
possibility of Morocco´s adherence to the Geneva 
Convention of 1864 or that at least he “gave the 
orders so that the authorities and armed forces of 
the Empire respect the immunity of hospitals and 
ambulances in times of war”9.
The request was sent to the head of the Spanish Le-
gation in Tangier, Emilio de Ojeda, who presented it in 
September to the naib Sidi Mohammed Torres and his 
assistant Sidi Mohammed Lebbadi. The answer sub-
sequently received by Ojeda was negative since the 
Sultan argued that 
despite his best wishes, he could not subscribe to the 
humanitarian goals pursued by the Central Commit-
tee of the SRC, as the irregular nature of the armed 
contingent in Morocco, mostly composed of qabilas 
[tribes] which come without any order from all over 
the country and gather in the battleground, prevent-
ed him from undertaking such a commitment 10.
In June 1899, the president of the Central Commit-
tee of the SRC again asked the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs to try to convince the Sultan to endorse the Ge-
neva Convention “because of the great interest it [the 
request] had for humanity”11. The Sultan once more 
rejected a proposal that would never be offered to 
him again. It must be pointed out that these démarch-
es were made while General Eusebio Sáenz Sáenz 
acted as president of the SRC, a transitional two-year 
period between the long terms of office of General 
Camilo Polavieja. In February 1897 a commission had 
been appointed to draft new regulations for the as-
sociation; although presented in April they would only 
be passed in August 189912. Three of its members, the 
Army medical officer Gregorio Andrés y Espala, the 
SRC inspector César Órdax y Avecilla, and especially 
Rafael Torres Campos, a leading actor in Africanist 
and regenerationist circles in Madrid, had contacts 
Picture 2. Request of the Spanish Red Cross to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the adherence of the 
Sultan of Morocco to the Geneva Convention (May, 
1897). Source: AMAEC.
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with Óvilo. Even though he had been sent to Cuba, 
Óvilo could have promoted the SRC initiative through 
his contacts in the commission or in the association 
in general13. In any case, SRC attempts at persuading 
the Sultan to sign the Geneva Convention were the 
climax of a ten-year effort of convergence between 
Moroccan reform and Spanish regeneration plans in 
the field of secular humanitarianism. Their failure re-
flected the damage inflicted upon Spanish influence 
in Morocco by the wars of independence of Cuba and 
the Philippines and by the subsequent loss of both 
overseas possessions. It also reflected how Morocco 
gradually came to regard immobility instead of reform 
as the only way to avoid other, more coercive Europe-
an (non-Spanish) interventions which were now the 
dominant alternatives on the path to modernisation.
RESILIENT “HUMANITARIAN SOVEREIGNTY” VERSUS 
FRANCO-SPANISH IMPERIALISM, 1906-1921
The international conference held at Algeciras in 
the beginning of 1906 marked the start of a new pe-
riod in the history of Morocco defined by the final loss 
of its independence. The establishment of two so-
called “zones of influence”, one assigned to France, 
the other to Spain, was agreed at that conference and 
became the basis for the creation of the French and 
Spanish Protectorates in 1912 (González Alcantud, 
Martín Corrales, 2007; Delaunay, 2010, pp. 224-247). 
The French zone being much larger and more relevant 
than the Spanish, it reflected the actual takeover of 
European influence in Morocco in favour of the first 
country. Despite all, the conference still proclaimed 
Moroccan sovereignty, especially with regard to the 
Sultan as religious leader and head of State and to a 
number of institutions based in Tangier14. The Alge-
ciras Act should be thus considered, in my opinion, 
as the legal embodiment of a weakening though re-
silient Moroccan sovereignty that the Protectorate 
Treaties and their ensuing legislation failed to quash 
completely, thanks in many ways to the long-lasting 
support provided to it by countries such as Germany, 
Great Britain or the United States.
Such resilience posed a continuous threat dur-
ing the early stage of French and Spanish domina-
tion. The allocation of spheres of influence to both 
countries had been agreed for the sake of Moroccan 
integrity and sovereignty and therefore they were 
ultimately subject to them. The Algeciras provisions 
also served as a basis for the exclusion of Tangier and 
its long-standing institutions from the French and 
Spanish Protectorates, and were a crucial reason for 
the uprising of Abdelhafid against his brother Sultan 
Abdelaziz in 1907-08 and of the Riffian leader Mu-
hammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi (Abdelkrim 
for short) in 1921. From the 1930s onwards, Moroc-
can nationalists would continue to invoke them and 
Sultan Mohammed V did so again in his manifesto 
for independence delivered in Tangier in 1947. In a 
different way, Morocco’s resilient sovereignty would 
drive France and Spain to try and extend their imperi-
alist ambitions to Tangier and the part of the country 
beyond their control. They realised that the only way 
to hold down the threat of Morocco’s agency, would 
have been to ensure exclusive control over the whole 
country. Such an a attempt would prove a failure in 
the end, even for the more powerful French, but it 
fuelled a sustained competition for hegemony be-
tween France and Spain which greatly contributed to 
what Jean-Marc Delaunay has termed méfiance cor-
diale (amiable mistrust) between the two countries 
in the first third of the 20th century (Delaunay, 2010).
Regarding the Red Cross during this period, the 
chances that the Sultan would sign up to the Geneva 
Convention and create an official local society faded. 
However, they were still possible from a legal point of 
view thanks to the “humanitarian sovereignty”15 as-
serted by initiatives taken in previous decades. A re-
verse proof of that possibility occurred in September 
1908 when the creation of a so-called “Red Cross and 
Lifeboat Board. Morocco” (Sociedad de Cruz Roja y 
Salvamento de Náufragos. Marruecos) in Madrid was 
communicated to the diplomatic representatives of 
Spain, France, Great Britain and Germany in Tangier16. 
Its president was Julio de Lecea y Navas, director of 
the Academia Heráldica, an institution acting as a 
higher board of the Order of the Hospitaller Knights of 
St. John the Baptist, a minor, historically discontinuous 
branch of the Order of Malta in Spain17. The Spanish 
Legation in Tangier informed the minister of Foreign 
Picture 3. Sidi Mohammed Torres and Moroccan dele-
gates landing at Algeciras to attend the international 
conference. Source: Le Petit Journal, Supplement de 
Dimanche, 21/1/1906.
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Affairs who forwarded the dispatch to the Central 
Committee of the SRC. Its president, the Marquis of 
Polavieja, considered that the Spanish government 
should immediately proceed to ban that charity be-
cause an association established in Spanish territory 
could not possibly have the right to act on, so it was 
affirmed, an “independent and sovereign power” as 
Morocco18. The creation of a Red Cross society with 
the name of that country could only be done locally 
and needed the Sultan to endorse the new Geneva 
Convention of July 1906, which he had failed to do, 
as previously with the first one in 1897 and 189919. 
The SRC should also be regarded as the only Spanish 
humanitarian association allowed by the government 
to extend its activities to Morocco because it had en-
joyed official status in Spain since 1864. Despite pro-
tests, the Red Cross and Lifeboat Society of Morocco 
continued to exist though it did not undertake any ac-
tual initiatives beyond appointing several delegates. It 
seems to have disappeared after a scandal in 191120.
A second, indirect proof of the persistence of Mo-
rocco’s sovereignty was the stiff though underground 
competition between the Spanish and the French 
Red Cross for complete “humanitarian hegemony” 
in the country. Only after such hegemony had been 
achieved, could a typically colonial Red Cross have 
been set up and put to work21. However, even France 
would fall short of the target. Soon after the Algeciras 
Act had been signed, the French started the occupa-
tion of the country through military campaigns which 
offered a perfect chance for the French Red Cross 
(FRC) to extend its activities into Moroccan territory22. 
Spain and the SRC followed suit. It soon became clear 
that neither the FRC nor the SRC would confine their 
activities to their theoretical areas of influence. Tan-
gier, in particular, became the main locus of competi-
tion as both nations realised that the annexation of 
the city to their Protectorate would strike a decisive 
blow in their unfailing aspiration to control the whole 
country. That is why some of the earliest and most im-
portant Red Cross initiatives of France and Spain were 
carried out there. In the French case, they were about 
to start in 1907, when the secretary of the Sociéte 
de Secours aux Blessés Militaires General de Valence 
tried in vain to send the first FRC nurses to Tangier 
rather than Casablanca, and to ensure the evacuation 
hospital for casualties suffered during the occupation 
of the latter city, was established in the former (Bet-
tex, 1908, p. 84). Nurses would be actually sent to 
Tangier in 1912, shortly after the so-called “Fez mu-
tiny”. They remained in the city for several months be-
fore moving to the imperial capital, where they were 
attached to various military hospitals (Lyautey, 1933, 
p. 732). In February 1918, the local FRC committee 
presided by Mme. Boissonas, wife of the head of the 
French Legation, opened the city’s first goutte de lait 
(milk station)23. In the case of Spain, the pharmacy La 
Cruz Roja began to function in the 1910s and provid-
ed drugs to European and Moroccan charity institu-
tions24. In 1917, a Casa de Socorro (emergency clinic) 
was opened where free medical and surgical care was 
provided for Moroccans and Europeans25. In 1920 the 
SRC opened its own gota de leche (milk station)26.
Picture 4. Operating room of the Spanish Red Cross 
emergency clinic in Tangier, date unknown. Source: 
Laredo (1994).
Picture 5. French Red Cross civil and military schemes 
in Morocco, date unknown. Source: Lyautey (1933).
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Beyond Tangier, France also led the deployment of 
pan-Moroccan strategies aimed at winning large ter-
ritorial and popular support for the cause of the FRC. 
On the one hand, it readily integrated Red Cross ac-
tivities into its Protectorate’s public health structures 
so that they helped show the FRC’s civilising character 
in comparison with the militaristic tone of Spanish hu-
manitarian intervention. Since 1911 FRC nurses work-
ing in the military hospitals of Rabat and Casablanca 
had begun to assist Moroccan women who “demand-
ed their services for their sick children”27. Owing to 
the exceptionally influential position of Mme. Lyautey, 
head of the FRC in Morocco, after her husband was 
appointed High Commissioner in 1912, the FRC man-
aged to expand these civil activities by contributing to 
the development of the official medical care scheme 
addressed to the Moroccan population, the so-called 
Assistance Médicale Indigene (AMI)28. In 1913, the 
FRC opened its first dispensary for women and chil-
dren in Rabat, named “Marie-Feuillet” in memory of 
a nurse who had died of typhoid fever while assisting 
French soldiers29. A mixed maternal clinic opened in 
Rabat, adjacent to the dispensary, as well as gouttes 
de lait in Rabat, Salé, Fez and Casablanca (Fiessinger, 
1923, p. 44-47; Woytt-Gisclard, 1936, p. 74, 198-201). 
A first anti-tuberculosis dispensary was set up in Fez 
in 1920 followed by another one in Casablanca30. Fur-
thermore, France single-handedly promoted the rep-
resentation of Morocco in international associations, 
including some in connection with humanitarian-
ism, effectively monopolising the country’s outward 
projection, to the detriment of Spain. For example, 
Marshall Lyautey “tried to secure Morocco’s repre-
sentation at the Peace Conference of Versailles and 
its entry into the League of Nations – a move that was 
blocked by Britain, which feared that Egypt would 
demand the same” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 18). More suc-
cessfully, he achieved its admission to the Office Inter-
nationale d’Hygiène Publique in 1920 while his wife 
acted as “Moroccan” representative in the meetings 
of the Union Internationale contre la Tuberculose of 
1924 and 192631.
CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES: RIFFIAN DEMANDS 
FOR A RED CROSS/CRESCENT, 1921-1926
The Rif War opened a new period in the history of 
Morocco (Ayache, 1996; Pennell, 2001; Madariaga, 
2009). It also witnessed the most serious attempt 
at creating a Red Cross/Crescent society in Moroc-
co before its actual foundation in 1956-57. Such a 
project showed continuities with previous initiatives, 
either with regard to the resilience of Morocco’s 
humanitarian sovereignty, or to widespread foreign 
support and continuing Franco-Spanish competi-
tion. However, it was also a product of substantial 
new developments. The interplay between old and 
new elements will be briefly sketched in this section. 
To begin with, it should be stressed that the Riffian 
leader Abdelkrim based his demand for international 
recognition of an independent “Rif Republic” on the 
provisions of the Algeciras Act. In his Declaration of 
State and Proclamation to All Nations addressed to 
several European governments and the League of 
Nations in July 1923, he argued that “before 1906 
the actual stand of the Rif regarding this sovereign 
[the Sultan of Morocco] was almost independent”32. 
After the Algeciras Act which “proclaims the integrity 
of Morocco throughout all its extent” had been vio-
lated by the establishment of the French and Span-
ish Protectorates, the Rif government, organized as a 
“modern Republic government” since 1920, had de-
cided to notify “to all Powers that it intends to pre-
serve its political independence absolutely”33.
A humanitarian corollary of Abdelkrim’s proclama-
tion was no other than the right of the Rif Republic 
to organize its own Red Cross/Crescent and have it in-
ternationally recognised. By contrast with the end of 
the 19th century, Morocco’s humanitarian sovereignty 
would no longer be in the hands of the Sultan and the 
State, which lacked legitimacy and agency after be-
coming subject to Franco-Spanish dictates. Legitimacy 
now corresponded to the popular Riffian uprising, its 
charismatic leader and the political-administrative-
military structures set up in the Rif since 1920. On 
these grounds, Abdelkrim made repeated attempts 
throughout the war at founding a Riffian Red Cross/
Crescent. Given the general precariousness of materi-
al and human resources which hampered the Riffians 
during the whole conflict, his main strategy consisted 
of demanding the ICRC to send a medical mission to 
the Rif so that it laid the material and human bases for 
creating a relief organisation on the field while grant-
ing it official international status. This appeal to the 
ICRC would be made at least five times in different 
forms between 1924 and 1926.
The first took place in June 1924 when Abdelkrim 
got in contact with one of his several Moroccan agents 
in Tangier, Abdelkrim ibn al-Hadj Ali Luh (Sasse, 2005, 
p. 317). Ali Luh urged Robert Gordon-Canning, a Brit-
ish ex-officer who would later become Abdelkrim’s 
most important foreign representative, to get in touch 
with his “British friends” in London and “seek every 
means possible to persuade them to extend their 
hand to us in politics, also specially in our Red Cross 
which is in so much need”34. As a result of Gordon-
Canning’s demarche, Dr. Ernst H. Griffin, a member of 
the British private charity British Red Crescent (BRC) 
and of the Near and Middle East Association (NMEA), 
addressed the ICRC. He complained of the great suf-
fering of Riffians because “owing to the lack of funds 
the work of the Red Crescent (or Red Cross) is severely 
hampered […] so that the wounded and dying have 
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perforce to be left to endure the utmost suffering”35. 
Thus, he asked the Committee if any medical mission 
had been sent to the Rif and if not, urged that one was 
organised “with the utmost speed”36. The vice-presi-
dent of the ICRC, Paul des Gouttes, answered Griffin 
that no demand for intervention had been hitherto 
received by the Committee and no inquiry made in 
consequence. He reminded him that the ICRC could 
not possibly intervene without “the demand or the 
formal consent” of the SRC, whose prerogative in the 
Spanish Protectorate was taken for granted37. Despite 
the negative, Des Gouttes immediately forwarded 
Griffin’s letter to the SRC president the Marquis of 
Hoyos and asked him if an international relief mission 
would be accepted38. Hoyos replied that all the popu-
lation in the Spanish Protectorate was duly assisted 
“by the Spanish government, the makhzen [the Mo-
roccan government under Spanish control] and the 
SRC”39. Des Gouttes also decided to appoint Raymond 
Schlemmer as “special delegate” for dealing with the 
Rif War issues.
In a second move, the Riffians tried to indirectly ob-
tain the ICRC’s involvement by persuading the British 
government either to support a BRC/NMEA medical 
mission to the Rif, or to undertake its own humani-
tarian intervention. Foreign relief would trigger the 
Committee’s involvement. Attempts were made at 
contacting the Foreign Office and a press campaign 
was started in October 1924 with a letter sent to The 
Times in which the BRC denounced the suffering of 
Riffians and their lack of doctors, drugs and medical 
equipment40. Letters were later sent to other news-
papers such as The Manchester Guardian, in which 
allegations were made of gas bombing of civilians by 
Spanish aeroplanes41. However, the British govern-
ment refused either to grant support for a BRC medical 
mission, or to intervene directly in the conflict42. The 
third attempt saw a tactical change. The Riffians real-
ised that the unofficial character of the BRC and the 
NMEA hindered their claims, an obstacle that would 
be overcome if an official Red Cross society demand-
ed the intervention of the ICRC. In January 1925 they 
got in touch in Paris with Dr. Lucien Jacquin, a former 
Troupes Coloniales medical officer who had been sta-
tioned in New Caledonia and Morocco – in the latter 
country he had witnessed first-hand the Fez mutiny 
of April 1912. Jacquin wrote a letter of denunciation 
and an appeal for help which he addressed to the Red 
Cross societies of the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Sweden and to the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC)43. 
As a result, the Swedish Red Cross (SwRC) became 
the first Red Cross society to officially request infor-
mation on the Rif War to the ICRC44. The Dutch Red 
Cross declined to take any action but forwarded the 
letter to the ICRC and the League of Nations45. Dr. Akil 
Muhtar Özen, head of the TRC sent a telegram to the 
ICRC informing on Jacquin’s letter and reminding that 
several “Turkish and Muslim countries” had already 
demanded that a Red Cross medical mission would be 
sent to the Rif46. Such pressures led the ICRC to elabo-
rate the first report on the Rif War and its démarches 
in relation to it, which would be published in the Feb-
ruary 1925 issues of the Bulletin International des So-
ciétés de la Croix-Rouge and the Revue Internationale 
de la Croix-Rouge47. The humanitarian claims of the 
Riffians were thus given a somewhat official character, 
though no further move was made by the ICRC on the 
legalistic grounds that it “has never received a direct 
appeal from the Riffians themselves, and the Central 
Committees of the aforementioned national socie-
ties seem to be in the same case”48. No permission 
was obtained from Spain either. For the third time, 
the ICRC contacted the SRC but the Marquis of Hoyos 
rejected its suggestion responding that the Spanish 
society would itself proceed to organise and send a 
medical mission – which it failed to do49.
The Riffians forwarded a fourth request on May 
1925, when their military offensive against the French 
Protectorate was raging. Gordon-Canning, acting 
now as official foreign representative of Abdelkrim 
and the Rif government, personally addressed des 
Gouttes denying that the Riffians had not made a di-
rect appeal for humanitarian assistance to the ICRC50. 
He argued that he himself had been charged with 
that mission when visiting Tangier and the Rif eight-
een months before, a mission reminded to him again 
by Abdelkrim ibn Jilali and resulting in Dr. Griffin’s re-
quest of July 1924. Now, to avoid further misunder-
standings, Gordon-Canning appealed directly to the 
ICRC for humanitarian help in the name of the Riffians 
because it was “more necessary than ever before”51. 
He argued that the Riffians had the right to be as-
sisted by the Committee because they deserved the 
status of belligerents on three grounds. First, because 
they had remained “unconquered for 2000 years”; 
second, because they had always been regarded as 
bled al-siba (rebellious zone) by the Sultan; and third, 
because international law stipulated that
“the population of a territory which has not been oc-
cupied who on the approach of the enemy spontane-
ously take up arms to resist the invading troops shall 
be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly 
and respect the laws and customs of war”52.
In its reply, Des Gouttes argued again that the ICRC 
had not been directly addressed by the Rif govern-
ment. However, in October 1925, shortly before the 
beginning of the 6th Assembly of the League of Nations 
in Geneva, the ICRC’s president Gustave Ador and the 
special delegate for the Rif Raymond Schlemmer man-
aged to meet the French prime minister and minister 
of Foreign Affairs Aristide Briand and the Spanish del-
egate to the League of Nations José Quiñones de León 
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respectively (Durand, 1978, p. 200). They suggested 
both countries ought to give their permission so that 
the ICRC could send a medical mission to the Rif with 
the twofold purpose of providing medical care to Rif-
fian civilians and French and Spanish prisoners of war. 
Both refused and the Committee decided to send Dr. 
Henri Mentha as medical delegate to Tangier in No-
vember. His report would be published the following 
month in the ICRC’s journal with the title Mission à 
Tanger (Mentha, 1925). The last appeal for help made 
by the Riffians would be made in March-April 1926. 
Taking advantage of the trip to the Rif of Hans Alexan-
der Langlet, correspondent of the Swedish newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter (Daily News), Abdelkrim handed him 
a letter for Prince Carl, president of the SwRC53.
The letter reached Stockholm at the end of April 
and was forwarded to the ICRC. The Committee felt 
now legitimised to send a medical mission to the 
Rif even without the approval of France and Spain, 
though it looked for and obtained the consent of both 
countries. Dr. Albert Reverdin, former ICRC delegate 
in the Balkan Wars, in the Upper Silesia crisis and in 
the French-occupied Ruhr, was appointed head of the 
mission (Bouvier, 1929, pp. 92-99). Funds and equip-
ment were requested from the SwRC, the TRC and the 
Dutch and German Red Cross societies54. However, 
the very moment Reverdin was about to enter the Rif, 
the French announced Abdelkrim’s surrender to its 
troops. Even though the war dragged on for another 
year, this put an end to the ICRC mission and to the 
project of creating a Riffian Red Cross/Crescent.
Apart from the Algeciras Act’s statement of Moroc-
can integrity and sovereignty, the second dimension 
of Riffian Red Cross initiatives in which elements of 
continuity and change became intertwined was for-
eign support. As has already been shown, late 19th 
century humanitarian projects in Morocco had partly 
relied on Spanish “regenerationist” intervention. Af-
ter 1906, Morocco’s humanitarian sovereignty would 
persist thanks to the backing of the Algeciras Act by 
Germany, Great Britain or the United States against 
Franco-Spanish exclusivism. The project of a Riffian 
Red Cross/Crescent would depend on international 
support to an even larger extent than earlier initia-
tives, not least due to the structural weakness and 
contested legitimacy of the Rif Republic in compari-
son with the old Shariffian Empire. Actually, most re-
lief came from non-official, non-governmental and/or 
non-Western sources. One of the most relevant was, 
for example, the previously mentioned British Red 
Crescent, a private charity funded by wealthy British 
India Muslims based in London, which had begun its 
relief operations during the Italian invasion of Tripoli 
in 1911 and had continued them through the Bal-
kan Wars and the First World War (British Red Cres-
cent, 1915). Substantial aid came also from the ERC, 
through the initiatives of its president Omar Tousson, 
to whom we will refer later. Merchants, journalists, 
arms-dealers, fascist and communist sympathisers 
and anonymous individuals acted in favour of Riffians 
or helped spread their claims and appeals to the inter-
national community (Sasse, 2005, pp. 69-85).
A third and final axis of continuity and change re-
ferred to the sustained competition between France 
and Spain for complete humanitarian hegemony in 
Morocco. During the Rif War, French humanitarian 
interference in Spanish Morocco increased, further 
diminishing the SRC’s prestige by highlighting its in-
ability to fulfil its duties. For example, with regard 
to the question of prisoners of war, the SRC did not 
find a solution to the captivity of more than 500 of-
ficers, soldiers and civilians in the Rif between July 
1921 and January 1923 (Madariaga, 2005, pp. 203-
249). Abdelkrim rejected all its attempts to release 
those prisoners and forbade SRC physicians to enter 
the Rif with relief convoys being regularly sent from 
the Alhucemas rock. In the end, it was the Basque fin-
ancier Horacio Echevarrieta who negotiated with Ab-
delkrim and paid a ransom of several million pesetas. 
In the middle of that year-and-a-half-long episode, 
Madame Lyautey met the Spanish King Alfonso XIII 
in March 1922 in an unofficial visit to Spain with her 
husband and may have suggested to him that the FRC 
took control of the problem55. Sgt. Francisco Basallo, 
a prisoner in the Rif, was subsequently told by his 
Picture 6. Original letter sent by Abdelkrim to the 
Swedish Red Cross (March, 1926). Source: Riksarkivet, 
Stockholm.
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guards that “France wished to intervene in the pro-
vision of food and medical care to the Spanish pris-
oners by sending FRC nurses, food, clothes, etc. and 
had asked Abdelkrim for permission” (Basallo, 1923, 
p. 118). Later on that year, Madame Lyautey surrepti-
tiously reminded the King, by way of the Spanish am-
bassador in Paris, that “the FRC stood side by side the 
Spanish society for everything it deemed necessary 
[in Morocco]” (Angolotti, 1958, p. 109). Her propos-
als were not taken into consideration.
This episode would be followed by others of a dif-
ferent kind. For example, French Protectorate author-
ities had been allowing medical personnel, equip-
ment and drugs to enter the Rif from Algeria via the 
French Protectorate since at least 1922. Abdelkrim’s 
agent in the Oran province, Haddu ibn Hammu, was 
systematically granted access on the grounds that he 
conducted “humanitarian missions” (Sasse, 2005, p. 
125, 157). On the other hand, on December 1924 the 
French prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs 
Édouard Herriot was informed by the French consul 
in Cairo that Prince Omar Tousson planned to send 
aid to the Riffians56. The consul also informed Mar-
shall Lyautey, who said he would not stop relief as 
long as it consisted merely of drugs and not physi-
cians. After contacts with French authorities, the ERC 
finally set to organise a “medical mission comprising 
five physicians, a chemist and forty nurses” sched-
uled for the end of January 192557. Its leader would 
be the Syrian Mohammed Said el-Din el-Djibaoui, an 
agent sent by Abdelkrim to raise funds in the Middle 
East and British India, and the physicians would be 
students from the Damascus Medical School58. The 
mission was delayed and endured some changes. For 
example, it arrived at the Rif by sea because Tous-
son had been chartering boats loaded with guns for 
Abdelkrim since December 192459. In March 1925 he 
bought the yacht Pharaoh and in the summer “Egyp-
tian and Tunisian doctors” were supposedly working 
in the Rif (Sasse, 2005, p. 78). The French radically 
changed their previous indulgence of foreign human-
itarian aid for the Riffians after Abdelkrim attacked 
their Protectorate in the spring of 1925. From then 
on, relief convoys from French Algeria were prevent-
ed from entering Morocco and reaching the Rif while 
the FRC joined the SRC in blocking all international 
moves to create and recognise a Riffian Red Cross/
Crescent, including an ICRC’s medical mission.
CONCLUSION
Late 19th century plans for joining the Red Cross 
movement can be taken as another example of inde-
pendent Morocco’s modernizing projects in the field 
of medicine and public health. Despite their failure to 
materialize before the Protectorate period they none-
theless paralleled similar, more accomplished develop-
ments in leading Islamic countries such as the Ottoman 
Empire, Egypt and Persia. A weak, problematic, though 
utterly resilient drive towards modernization would 
have been the thread connecting the creation of the 
Tangier Lifeboat Board in 1886, the demarchés for join-
ing the Geneva Convention in 1897-99 and the Riffian 
demands for a Red Cross/Red Crescent society in 1924-
26 with the creation of the Moroccan Red Crescent in 
1956. The focus on Franco-Spanish domination over 
the country should not dismiss those early events as a 
mere product of foreign impositions, nor should they 
be neglected as irrelevant when compared with the 
multiple and larger activities of the French and Spanish 
Red Cross societies during the Protectorate period. The 
history of modern secular humanitarianism in Morocco 
was also in part a product of Moroccan agency, either 
stemming from state reforms promoted by the Sultan, 
or as an expression of popular anti-imperialist demands 
formulated by insurgent leaders. Morocco’s medical 
history of the 19th and 20th centuries would have had, 
thus, a self-made, own component of modernity root-
ed in resilient local agency persistently confronting and 
influencing foreign pressures and impositions.
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NOTES
1 The Egyptian Red Crescent was only recognized by the ICRC in 
1924. It was allowed to use a symbol of “decrescent”, different 
from the Ottoman/Turkish society’s crescent (Dinstein, Domb, 
2011, p. 247).
2 The Azerbaijan society was dissolved when the Soviet Red Army 
occupied the country and would not be reestablished until 
1922. A year later it would be subsumed within the Union of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR where it remained 
until Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991.
3 http://www.croissant-rouge.ma/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=46, [retrieved on 25/7/2013]
4 The term resilience originally had a mechanical sense, mean-
ing the power or ability to return to the original form and po-
sition after being bent, compressed, or stretched. In current 
psychology it is figuratively used to describe how individuals 
can successfully cope with social disadvantage or highly adverse 
conditions, including physical and psychological trauma, either 
returning to a previous “normal” state, or not showing negative 
effects. See, for example, Werner, Smith (2001). In my opinion, 
this term could be applied to the social sciences for a better un-
derstanding of how certain non-European societies managed to 
withstand European expansionism either by successfully reas-
serting themselves in front of it, or by recovering to a significant 
extent from an actual phase of domination.
5 The Rif is a mountain range which roughly stretches along Mo-
rocco’s Mediterranean coast between the city of Tangier and 
the Spanish enclave of Melilla. The Riffians are the Berber/
Amazigh population established in the central and Eastern parts 
of that region.
6 Al Mogreb al-Aksa, 12/12/1886. It was also called Junta de Sal-
vamento Marítimo (Maritime Rescue Board).
7 Vidal had acted as representative of the Spanish Lifeboat So-
ciety in Tangier since at least 1884. The following year, he had 
managed to convince local elites to address the Society so that a 
local board was created in that city. See at Revista de Geografía 
Comercial, 1 (3) (July 1885), p. 47.
8 Al-Mogreb al-Aksa, 4/9/1892; El Día, 31/8/1892; Diario de Cór-
doba, 2/9/1892; La Época, 1/9/1892.
9 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación 
(AMAEC), Archivo Histórico, Legajo H2743 (AMAEC-AH, leg. 
H2743, henceforth).
10 AMAEC-AH, leg. H2743.
11 AMAEC-AH, leg. H2743.
12 “Real decreto creando una Comisión encargada de estu-
diar y proponer al Gobierno las bases para reorganizar la 
Sección Española de la Asociación internacional de la Cruz 
Roja”, Gaceta de Madrid, 43 (12/2/1897), p. 660; “Bases para 
la reorganización de la Cruz Roja”, Gaceta de Madrid, 241 
(29/8/1899), pp. 764-765.
13 Although the commission held twelve meetings between Feb-
ruary and April, no proposal regarding Morocco was explicitly 
discussed. (1901) Actas de la Junta encargada de proponer al 
gobierno las bases para la reforma de la Cruz Roja Española. 
Madrid, Antonio Lamas y José María Díaz Impresores. How-
ever, members of the commission or of the SRC would have 
been well aware of Óvilo’s plans and acknowledged their use-
fulness for the organisation at the very moment its sphere of 
action in Cuba and the Philippines was endangered. It was 
maybe thought that the reorganisation of the SRC should be 
accompanied by a shift from expansion in fading overseas pos-
sessions to promising African territories.
14 Full text of “General Act of the International Conference of 
Algeciras, signed April 7, 1906”. http://archive.org/stream/js-
tor-2212340/2212340_djvu.txt, [retrieved on 25/7/2013]
15 The concept of “humanitarian sovereignty” currently has two 
main, contradictory senses. On the one hand, it refers to the 
right (and obligation) of the international community to inter-
vene in humanitarian crises, placing a population or territory 
under its direct control for relief and protection purposes. The 
second meaning, which is used in this article, refers to the right 
(and obligation) of a particular State to control or organise relief 
in its own territory and for the benefit of its own population as 
opposed to non-consented foreign intervention.
16 Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Fondo África, 
81/262.
17 This branch had been created in 1804 and provided medical as-
sistance to Spanish soldiers during the Spanish-Moroccan War 
of 1859-60 and the last war for Cuban independence. (1881), 
Reglamento de los Reales Caballeros Hospitalarios Españoles de 
San Juan Bautista, Madrid, Academia Heráldica. http://www.or-
derstjohn.org/osj/spain.htm, [retrieved on 22/07/2013].
18 AMAEC-AH, Leg. H2743.
19 The international congress for revising the 1864 Convention took 
place in Geneva in June and July of 1906. According to Hutchin-
son, the new convention “revealed the degree to which the civi-
lising mission of the Red Cross had been adapted to the require-
ments of states and armies as well as to the lessons of practical 
experience gained since the 1860s”. Hutchinson, 1996, p. 199.
20 Delegates were appointed for Belgium, the Low Countries, Algeria 
and Tunisia. The last was responsible for a scandal in Paris after sell-
ing diplomas and decorations of real or virtual honorary and charity 
associations at high prices for self-profit. Le Matin, 17/4/1911.
21 Unquestioned rights over a territory stood behind the colonial 
nature of the structure and activities of Red Cross societies such 
as the Dutch East Indies Red Cross (Indonesia), the Algerian Red 
Cross or the Indian Red Cross. See, for example, Van Bergen, 
1993; Lygrisse, 1983.
22 Further details on the chronology and nature of that extension 
in Martínez Antonio, in press.
23 http://www.tangeryotrasutopias.com/2009/08/cronologia-
de-la-obra-social-y-cultural.html, [retrieved on 22/07/2013; 
Marruecos, I (s.f.), pp. 11-14.
24 AGA, Fondo África, 81/249, Legajo 2662.
25 ABC, 29/07/1922.
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26 Archive de Médecine des Enfants, 25 (1922), p. 234.
27 h t t p : / / d a f i n a . n e t / f o r u m s / r e a d .
php?52,217755,219121,page=3, [retrieved on 28/06/2012].
28 Although the creation of civil hospitals, clinics and dispensaries 
was supposedly addressed to Moroccans, in fact many of these 
institutions had a mixed character, assisting both Moroccan and 
French civilians.
29 Bulletin of the League of Red Cross Societies, 2 (October 1920 – 
December 1921), pp. 293-294.
30 Bulletin mensuel de l’Union des Femmes de France, 4 (35) (23 
May 1923), p. 114; (38) (1 August 1923), p. 192.
31 Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France (AMAEF), 
Sous-fonds Maroc 1917-1940, Carton 842; (1927), Proceedings 
of the Fifth Conference of the International Union against Tu-
berculosis, New York, National Tuberculosis Association of the 
United States, p. 41.
32 Declaration of State and Proclamation to All Nations. Ajdir, 
10th July 1923 (Christian Era). Archive de la Société de Na-
tions (ASDN), Political R591, Clasement 11, Document 30065, 
Dossier 12861.
33 Ibidem.
34 Archive du Comité Internationale de la Croix-Rouge (ACICR), CR 
138 Riffains (ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, henceforth), I, 94.
35 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 1.
36 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 1.
37 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 2.
38 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 3.
39 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 4.
40 The Times, 18/10/1924.
41 The Manchester Guardian, 25/11/1924.
42 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 66.
43 Ibidem.
44 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 62.
45 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 66. 
46 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 67.
47 “Comité International. Demandes d’intervention. Secours aux 
blessés du Riff”, Bulletin Internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-
Rouge (BISCR), LV, 270; Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 
(RICR), 74 (February 1925), pp. 113-116.
48 “Comité International”, p. 116.
49 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 81.
50 ACICR-CR 138 Riffains, I, 94.
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